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I. INTRODUCTION
The problem cannot be overstated. An estimated 19.4% of noninstitutionalized civilians in the United States, or 48.9 million people,
have a disability.1 Almost half of these people, an estimated 24.1
Of all nonmillion Americans, have a severe disability.2
institutionalized persons age fifteen and over in the United States,
17.5% (roughly 34.2 million people) are limited in physical functions.3
These limitations include the ability to walk up a flight of stairs, hear
what is said in normal conversation, see words or letters in ordinary
newsprint, or get in and out of bed.4
In addition, approximately 28.1% of Americans, or 51.3 million
people, suffer from a diagnosable mental disorder.5 An estimated 2.2
million American adults suffer from schizophrenia.6 According to the
National Institute of Mental Health, 90% of people who commit suicide
have a diagnosable mental disorder.7 An estimated 284,000 inmates are
identified as having a mental illness, which represents about 16% of the
inmate populations of state and local jails.8 Lastly, four of the ten
leading causes of disability in the United States—major depression,

1
National Institute on Disability and Rehabilitation Research, Access to Disability
Data: Chartbook on Disability in the U.S., http://www.infouse.com/disabilitydata/
disability/1_1.php (last visited Mar. 30, 2006).
2
Id.
3
National Institute on Disability and Rehabilitation Research, Access to Disability
Data: Chartbook on Disability in the U.S., http://www.infouse.com/disabilitydata/
disability/1_2.php (last visited Mar. 30, 2006).
4
Id.
5
National Institute on Disability and Rehabilitation Research, Access to Disability
Data: Chartbook on Disability in the U.S., http://www.infouse.com/disabilitydata/
disability/1_5.php (last visited Mar. 30, 2006).
6
See National Institute of Mental Health, Mental Disorders in America,
http://www.intelihealth.com/IH/ihtIH/WSIHW000/8271/8849.html (last visited Mar.
30, 2006)
7
Id.
8
See Mental Illness and the Criminal Justice System, http://www.geocities.com/
stargazers_here/mental_illness.html?200528 (last visited Mar. 30, 2006).
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bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, and obsessive-compulsive disorder—
are mental illnesses.9
By 1990, Congress had come to recognize that existing law did
not deal with this issue adequately. Thus, Congress passed the
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”)10 to correct the
“discrimination against individuals with disabilities [that] persists in
such critical areas as . . . institutionalization, health services . . . and
access to public services.”11 In conjunction with Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act and the Fair Housing Amendments Act, Congress
enacted Title II of the ADA to facilitate access to the benefits of public
services, programs or activities for disabled, including mentally ill,
Americans who qualify for such services.
The passage of the ADA was widely lauded. Many commentators
saw it as an “emancipation proclamation” for people with disabilities.12
Since its passage, however, courts have limited the scope of the ADA.
For example, Katie Eyer writes that in University of Alabama v.
Garrett,13 the Supreme Court found that Title I of the ADA did not
validly abrogate the sovereign immunity of the states.14 The Court
upheld Title II of the ADA three years later, in Tennessee v. Lane.15
However, it did so on an as-applied basis.16 While favorable to
9

National Institute of Mental Health, supra note 6.
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213).
11
42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3) (2000); see also Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 526
(2004) (stating that “[i]n the deliberations that led up to the enactment of the ADA,
Congress identified important shortcomings in existing laws that rendered them
‘inadequate to address the pervasive problems of discrimination that people with
disabilities are facing.’”) (citation omitted). An example of such discrimination can be
found in Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (upholding the constitutionality of
state-imposed sterilization of the disabled). Justice Holmes expressed the views of
society at that time when he wrote that it would be “better for all the world, if instead of
waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their
imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their
kind.” Id.
12
Katie Eyer, Note, Rehabilitation Act Redux, 23 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 271, 271
(2005) (quoting Sen. Edward Kennedy).
13
531 U.S. 356, 360 (2001).
14
Eyer, supra note 12, at 271.
15
541 U.S. at 533-34. This case has sparked widespread commentary. See, e.g.,
Michael E. Waterstone, Lane, Fundamental Rights, and Voting, 56 ALA. L. REV. 793
(2005); Eyer, supra note 12; David J. Langeland, Note, Misapplication of Precedent:
The United States Supreme Court Ignores the Overbreadth of the ADA by Abrogating
State Sovereignty in Tennessee v. Lane, 38 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1065 (2005); Aaron
Ponzo, Note, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act Is a Valid Exercise of
Congress’ Power to Abrogate State Sovereign Immunity: Tennessee v. Lane, 43 DUQ.
L. REV. 317 (2005).
16
Eyer, supra note 12, at 271.
10
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individual litigants, Lane’s approach allows for the possibility that
some applications of Title II will be subject to a successful sovereign
immunity defense.17
Most recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit issued a potentially devastating opinion to disabled Americans.
In Wisconsin Community Service, Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, Judge
Easterbrook ruled that a disabled person seeking “reasonable
accommodation” does not have a cognizable cause of action under
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act or Title II of the ADA.18 The
Seventh Circuit granted Plaintiffs’ petition for rehearing en banc and
the full court will determine whether Title II of the ADA includes a
right to reasonable accommodation.19
If the en banc court upholds Judge Easterbrook’s decision, the
implications will be far reaching. In order to recover for a public
entity’s discrimination in the provision of public services, programs, or
activities, plaintiffs bringing a claim under Title II of the ADA will be
forced to argue one of two theories. Plaintiffs can argue intentional
discrimination, which occurs when a public entity intentionally denies a
public service or benefit on the basis of disability, or disparate impact,
which occurs when a public entity applies neutral rules or regulations in
a manner that adversely affects the disabled differently from the nondisabled. Simply put, the disabled will have no recourse for a public
entity’s failure to accommodate their special needs. Thus, for example,
HIV-positive patients will have no recourse if they cannot take
advantage of a city’s AIDS program because the city failed to put in
place certain features they need for access.20 Moreover, a city would be
under no duty to exempt a group of wheelchair-bound people from its
zoning rules so that those people could live together in a group home.21
This outcome would deal a devastating blow to disabled people’s
quality of life.
This article reviews Judge Easterbrook’s decision and argues that
it is contrary to established law. We begin by outlining the overview of
the case, including the factual background, the district court’s ruling,
Judge Easterbrook’s decision, and Judge Wood’s dissenting opinion.
Next, we explain the legislative history behind Congress’s enactment of
17

Id.
413 F.3d 642, 648 (7th Cir. 2005), vacated, reh’g granted en banc, No. 04-1966,
2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 19033 (7th Cir. Aug. 31, 2005).
19
Id.
20
See Henrietta D. v. Giuliani, 81 F. Supp. 2d 425 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
21
See, e.g., Dr. Gertrude A. Barber Ctr., Inc., v. Peters Twp., 273 F. Supp. 2d 643
(W.D. Pa. 2003).
18
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Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Title II of the ADA. Part IV
of this article analyzes Judge Easterbrook’s decision in light of the
legislative history and case law from the Supreme Court, the Seventh
Circuit, and other circuits that have considered whether Title II
recognizes a duty to reasonably accommodate qualified disabled
persons. Finally, we conclude in Part V that Judge Easterbrook’s
opinion is contrary to established law and urge the Seventh Circuit en
banc to overturn the Wisconsin Community Service decision.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE CASE
A. Factual and Procedural Background
The story is typical. Wisconsin Community Service (“WCS”) is a
private, non-profit organization that operates an outpatient mental
health clinic in the City of Milwaukee (the “City”).22 Without WCS,
many of these patients would not receive the necessary health services.
The vast majority of WCS’s 400 patients are disenfranchised –
currently in or just released from the criminal justice system and
suffering from mental illness and/or drug and alcohol problems.23 The
clinic provides, among other things, “psychiatric treatment, counseling,
medication monitoring, financial monitoring, housing assistance,
employment assistance, grocery shopping and transportation services”
to its clients.24 Most of WCS’s clients live in the area where both the
present and proposed facilities are located.25 In 1998, WCS decided to
relocate to a larger facility in order to serve the needs of its expanding
client base and alleviate the effects of overcrowding.26 Limited space
posed a serious problem because many clients could not cope with the
stimuli associated with overcrowding.27 Moreover, WCS relied heavily
on regular one-on-one sessions between clients and therapists, and the
lack of space compromised the privacy necessary for effective
sessions.28

22
Wisconsin Cmty. Serv., Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 309 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1098
(E.D. Wis. 2004), vacated, 413 F.3d 642, 648 (7th Cir. 2005).
23
See id.; Wisconsin Community Services, Inc., WCS Program Descriptions,
http://www.wiscs.org/ProgramDescriptions.aspx?ProgramID=33;
http://www.wiscs.org/
ProgramDescriptions.aspx?ProgramID=9 (last visited Mar. 30, 2006).
24
Wisconsin Cmty. Serv. Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d at 1099.
25
Id. at 1099-1100.
26
Id. at 1098, 1100.
27
Id. at 1100.
28
Id.
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After searching for more than three years for an adequate space,
WCS purchased an 81,000 square foot property approximately one mile
west of its old location.29 WCS planned to use only 20,000 square feet
of the property for its clinic and rent out, to commercial and noncommercial entities, the remaining 61,000 square feet.30 In order to
operate a health clinic at the newly purchased property, however, the
City’s zoning laws required WCS to obtain a special use permit, which
the City denied.31
WCS appealed the decision to the Board of Zoning Appeals
(“BOZA”), arguing that it satisfied the City’s four criteria for granting a
special use permit32 and, alternatively, that the ADA entitled WCS to a
permit as a reasonable accommodation.33 On May 9, 2001, BOZA
denied WCS’s request for a special use permit, stating that WCS had
not met the necessary criteria.34
On June 6, 2001, WCS filed suit in the district court and the judge
remanded the case to BOZA to determine whether WCS should be
granted a special use permit as a reasonable accommodation under the
ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.35 On December 27, 2002, BOZA
denied WCS’s request, determining that the accommodation was
neither reasonable nor necessary in this situation.36 WCS appealed the
denial to federal court once again.
B. The District Court’s Ruling
The district court ruled in WCS’s favor, explaining that “the sole
issue is whether the City discriminated against WCS’s clients on the
basis of their disability.”37 The court began its analysis by noting that
WCS could prove discrimination under any one of three theories under
Title II of the ADA: 1) intentional discrimination; 2) disparate impact;
or 3) failure to make a reasonable accommodation.38 In granting WCS’s
motion for summary judgment, the district court addressed only the
29

Id. at 1098.
Id. at 1107. Two non-commercial entities, the Social Security Administration and
the Milwaukee office of the National Alliance for the Mentally Ill, leased space in the
building at the time WCS purchased it. Id.
31
Id. at 1098.
32
The City’s criteria for obtaining a special use permit were: (1) protection of
public health, safety and welfare; (2) protection of property; (3) traffic and pedestrian
safety; and (4) consistency with the City’s comprehensive plan. Id. at 1098 n.3.
33
Id. at 1099.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id. at 1101.
37
Id. at 1104.
38
Id.
30
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reasonable accommodation theory because it found that theory to be
dispositive of the issue in the case.
The court reasoned that the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act
mirror the Fair Housing Amendments Act (“FHAA”), which requires
public entities to change neutral rules, policies, practices or services
when necessary to reasonably accommodate qualified individuals with
disabilities.39 Although Title II of the ADA does not contain the same
language as the FHAA, the court recognized that the regulations
promulgated by the U.S. Department of Justice to implement Title II,
contain a reasonable accommodation provision.40 Similarly, the
Rehabilitation Act “requires reasonable accommodation unless it
creates ‘undue financial or administrative burdens’ or ‘requires a
fundamental alteration in the nature of the program.’”41 The court found
that the language from the regulations of the agency entrusted with
implementing Title II, the Department of Justice, along with similar
language in the Rehabilitation Act, suggested that both acts imposed a
duty of reasonable accommodation on public entities.
Applying Title II’s implementing regulations, the district court
recognized that the duty to reasonably accommodate does not merely
require public entities to grant disabled persons the same access to
public services as non-disabled persons; Title II also protects the special
needs of disabled individuals.42 Thus, because the special needs of
disabled individuals are protected, where those needs are not shared by
the general public “it makes little sense to inquire whether the disabled
are entitled to equal opportunity to such services.”43 The court then
conducted a burden-shifting analysis, finding that “in order to prevail,
WCS must show only that its requested accommodation is reasonable
and necessary” and “if it makes such a showing, the City must then
demonstrate unreasonableness or undue hardship in the particular
circumstances.”44
39

Id. The FHAA definition of discrimination includes “a refusal to make
reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such
accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and
enjoy a dwelling.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B) (2000).
40
Wisconsin Cmty. Serv. Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d at 1104. At 28 C.F.R. §
35.130(b)(7), the implementing regulations provide that “[a] public entity shall make
reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications
are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability, unless the public entity
can demonstrate that making the modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of
the service, program or activity.”
41
Wisconsin Cmty. Serv. Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d at 1104.
42
Id.
43
Id. at 1105.
44
Id.
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The district court reasoned that “an accommodation is reasonable
if the benefit that it will provide to the disabled . . . outweighs the cost
to the public entity to implement it.”45 The court found that the presence
of a WCS clinic at the new site would not prevent a commercial entity
from locating there since WCS only intended to use about 25% of the
space in the building for its clinic.46 Further, two non-commercial
enterprises, the Social Security Administration and the local office of
the National Alliance for the Mentally Ill, already leased space in the
building at the time WCS bought it. The court held, therefore, that
requiring the City to grant WCS a special use permit was
“reasonable.”47
Next, the district court determined whether accommodation was
necessary. To establish this, the court found that “a plaintiff . . . need
only show that it made a good faith effort to find an alternative to the
accommodation but was unable to do so.”48 The court held that the
evidence showed that WCS had made a good faith effort to find a
suitable property that did not require a special use permit. It also
rejected the City’s argument that the search might have been more
successful if it had hired a buyer’s broker.49 Finally, the district court
found that the City failed to make a showing that granting WCS a
special use permit would cause undue hardship.50 Consequently, it
ordered the City to grant WCS a special use permit.51
C. Judge Easterbrook’s Panel Decision
Judge Easterbrook, writing for the Seventh Circuit panel majority,
overturned the district court decision, holding instead that “[n]either
Title II of the ADA nor the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794,
contains a general accommodation provision.”52 Conceding that “[a]n
accommodation requirement has been added to Title II by regulation
and to the Rehabilitation Act by judicial gloss plus another regulation,”
Judge Easterbrook nevertheless ruled that “Title II . . . lacks the sort of

45

Id.
Id. at 1106-07.
47
Id. at 1107.
48
Id. at 1108.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Wisconsin Cmty. Serv., Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 413 F.3d 642, 645 (7th Cir.
2005), vacated, reh’g en banc granted, No. 04-1966, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 19033
(7th Cir. Aug. 31, 2005).
46
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accommodation requirement to be found in Title III (or for that matter
Title I).”53
Judge Easterbrook reasoned that the FHAA does not require
municipalities to depart from their zoning codes to reduce the cost at
which disabled persons can acquire housing or mental-health services.54
Based on his reading of the FHAA, Judge Easterbrook found that the
act only imposes a duty of reasonable accommodation on public entities
where disabled persons are denied the same opportunity as non-disabled
individuals to obtain housing.55 According to Judge Easterbrook, the
FHAA assures only “equal opportunity” which means “freedom from
the adverse effects of local laws and rules that affect disabled persons
because of that disability, yet do not pose problems for equivalent but
non-disabled persons.”56 Judge Easterbrook noted that Milwaukee’s
zoning rules, and its stated criteria for special-use permits, treat mentalhealth and dental-health clinics identically.57 Thus, Judge Easterbrook
reasoned that in the absence of disparate impact there is no need for
accommodation under the FHAA, and by implication, Title II.58
Judge Easterbrook also addressed the Seventh Circuit’s ruling in
Good Shepherd Manor Foundation, Inc. v. City of Momence, where the
court wrote that “[f]ailure to reasonably accommodate is an alternative
theory of liability.”59 However, “[t]o say that reasonable
accommodation is an ‘alternative theory of liability’ is not . . . to say
that it is a theory independent of both intentional discrimination and
disparate impact.”60 In other words, Judge Easterbrook ruled that
reasonable accommodation is a remedy for disparate impact or
intentional discrimination but it is not a cognizable theory of liability
under Title II of the ADA.61 Judge Easterbrook conceded, however, that

53

Id.
Id. at 646.
55
Id.
56
Id. at 647.
57
Id.
58
Id. at 646.
59
Id. (internal quotations omitted) (citing Good Shepherd Manor Found., Inc. v.
City of Momence, 323 F.3d 557 (7th Cir. 2003)).
60
Id.
61
According to Judge Easterbrook, WCS would likely be unable to make a
showing of intentional discrimination or disparate impact because:
A requirement that imposes equal cost on all persons does not have such a
disparate impact. Just as everyone (disabled or not) needs housing and
would prefer to pay less, so everyone (disabled or not) needs medical care
and would prefer to pay less. If Milwaukee applies the same rules to
mental-health clinics and dental-health clinics, there is neither
discrimination nor disparate impact. The statutes do not require a city to be
54
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if Title II of the ADA does require the City to make reasonable
accommodations then granting WCS a special-use permit would be
reasonable in this case.62
D. Judge Wood’s Dissent
In his dissent, Judge Wood found that the regulations
implementing Title II unambiguously answer the question of whether
reasonable accommodation constitutes a cognizable theory of liability
independent of intentional discrimination or disparate impact in the
affirmative.63 Judge Wood noted that the “regulation says nothing about
an antecedent need to prove pre-existing intentional discrimination or
disparate impact” before advancing a theory of reasonable
accommodation.64 In so finding, Judge Wood cited to the Supreme
Court’s ruling in U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett,65 which required
reasonable accommodation in the employment discrimination (Title I)
context, because the language of the Department of Justice’s regulation
is “substantively identical” to the language at issue in Barnett.66
Judge Wood explained further that the “problem is that there are
many services and facilities that are of interest only to disabled people,
such as the ramps and the audible elevator announcements . . . . In those
situations, there would never be a way to prove either individual animus
or disparate impact, unless the latter theory were applied far more
broadly than it normally is.”67
Judge Wood concluded that the district court’s decision focused
on the rules, practices, et cetera, that hurt WCS and its clients because
of their mental disabilities, as opposed to their lack of money or other
characteristics that they share with many members of the general
public.68 Unlike affordable housing, mental health services are uniquely
important for people with mental disabilities.69 Judge Wood thus found
that Title II of the ADA imposed on the City an affirmative duty of
reasonable accommodation, the requested accommodation was

Id.

more forgiving when mental health clinics want to bend the rules than
when dental health clinics make the same request.
62

Id. at 648.
Id. at 649 (Wood. J., dissenting).
64
Id. at 649.
65
535 U.S. 391 (2002).
66
Wisconsin Cmty. Serv., 413 F.3d at 650 (Wood, J., dissenting).
67
Id.
68
Id. at 651 (citing Hemisphere Bldg. Co. v. Vill. of Richton Park, 171 F.3d 437,
440 (7th Cir. 1999)).
69
Id.
63
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reasonable and necessary, and the City should have granted WCS’s
request for a special use permit.70
III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
As Judge Easterbrook pointed out in his decision, neither the
Rehabilitation Act nor Title II of the ADA explicitly make reasonable
accommodation a cause of action.71 Reasonable accommodation,
therefore, does not exist under a plain reading of the statutes. However,
the legislative history of the two statutes reveals that Congress
apparently intended reasonable accommodation to be a cause of action
under both statutes.
A. Section 504
In 1973, Congress passed the Rehabilitation Act, the first federal
handicap discrimination statute.72 Under Section 504: “No otherwise
qualified individual with a disability in the United States . . . shall,
solely by reason of his or her disability, be excluded from the
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance.”73 Thus, Section 504 bars discrimination against
disabled persons in the administration of programs conducted by state
and local government74 and requires that programs or activities operated
by a federally funded entity be readily accessible to persons with
disabilities.75 Section 504’s regulations generally require that the
disabled have equal opportunities to achieve the same benefits as nondisabled persons. Each federal agency has promulgated regulations for

70

See id. at 652 (agreeing with the lower court’s holding in Wis. Cmty. Servs., Inc.
v. City of Milwaukee, 309 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1108 (E.D. Wis. 2004)).
71
Id. at 645 (majority opinion).
72
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified at 29
U.S.C. § 701 et seq.). Although Section 504 was passed in 1973, drafting and
promulgation of Section 504’s regulations took an exceedingly long time. As a result it
did not go into effect until 1976 after President Ford had left office. Mark C. Weber,
Disability Discrimination by State and Local Government: The Relationship Between
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act,
36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1089, 1093-95 (1995) (tracing history of passage of the
Rehabilitation Act).
73
29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000).
74
28 C.F.R. § 42.520 (2006).
75
Id. § 42.521(a).
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recipients of federal funding under its purview.76 Although there are
minor differences, the regulations are largely identical.77
The Supreme Court has recognized that there is a duty to
reasonably accommodate under the Rehabilitation Act.78 In
Southeastern Community College v. Davis, a hearing impaired plaintiff
sued the defendant’s nursing program for discriminating against her by
not providing the facilities she needed to attend the school.79 The Court
refused to recognize the discrimination claim, reasoning that Congress
did not intend Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act to include an
affirmative action requirement.80 Instead, the Court found that Section
504 protects only those handicapped individuals who are “otherwise
qualified,” a term which the court interpreted as “able to meet all of a
program’s requirements in spite of [a] handicap.”81 The Court, however,
recognized that reasonable accommodation may require an employer to
alter a program’s requirements because “situations may arise where a
refusal to modify an existing program might become unreasonable and
discriminatory.”82 The Davis Court found that there was no duty to
reasonably accommodate under the facts of that case.83
Later, in Alexander v. Choate84 and School Board of Nassau
County v. Arline,85 the Court held that an employer does not have a duty
to take affirmative action but does have “an affirmative obligation to
make reasonable accommodation for a handicapped employee.”86 In
Choate, the Court upheld a Medicaid plan that imposed an annual limit
on days of Medicaid-covered hospitalization, even though that plan had
a greater negative impact on persons with disabilities than other
76
See BONNIE P. TUCKER & BRUCE A. GOLDSTEIN, LEGAL RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH
DISABILITIES: AN ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL LAW, app. B (1991) (listing regulations
promulgated under § 504).
77
Compare 28 C.F.R. pt. 35 (implementing regulations of Title II by DOJ), with 49
C.F.R. pts. 27, 37, 38 (Titles II and III Department of Transportation), 29 C.F.R. pts.
1630, 1602 (Title I, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission), and 47 C.F.R. §§
64.601-.608 (Title IV, Federal Communications Commission).
78
See, e.g., L.D. Clark, Shields v. City of Shreveport: Federal Grantees Under the
Rehabilitation Act Escape Duty of Reasonable Accommodation Toward Alcoholics, 66
TUL. L. REV. 603 (1991); Robert B. Fitzpatrick & E. Anne Benaroya, Advanced
Employment Law and Litigation Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship
Under the ADA: Selected Issues, C669 ALI-ABA 389 (1991) (discussing the duty of
reasonable accommodation under the Rehabilitation Act).
79
442 U.S. 397, 402 (1979).
80
Id. at 410-11.
81
Id. at 406.
82
Id. at 412-13.
83
Id. at 413.
84
469 U.S. 287 (1985).
85
480 U.S. 273 (1987).
86
Id. at 289 n.19.
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possible Medicaid plans would have had, and lacked a justification to
make it superior to other forms of budget control with a lesser impact.87
The Court, however, was careful to distinguish the adverse impact
in Choate from the adverse impact that created architectural barriers
and had the affect of discriminating against the disabled in
transportation, job qualification, and education and recognized that
Section 504 did reach adverse impacts in these areas. 88 Most
importantly, the Court clarified the distinction made in Davis between
reasonable accommodation and affirmative action, holding that Davis
meant to exclude from the requirements of Section 504 only
fundamental alterations in programs.89
B. Title II of the ADA
Twelve years after Congress enacted the Rehabilitation Act,
President George H.W. Bush signed the ADA into law.90 The purpose
of the ADA was to establish “a clear and comprehensive national
mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with
disabilities”91 and was to “be broadly construed to effectuate its
purpose.”92 Title II of the ADA restates Section 504 in its general
terms: “Subject to the provisions of this subchapter, no qualified
individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be
excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services,
programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to
discrimination by any such entity.”93 Title II thus prohibits public
service entities from discriminating against disabled individuals.94
87

See Choate, 469 U.S. at 308-09.
See id. at 296-99. The Court held that § 504 must be kept within manageable
bounds.
89
Id. at 300-01 & n.20. The Court further developed this reasoning in Arline, 480
U.S. at 287 n.17, which distinguished the affirmative obligation to make reasonable
accommodations from affirmative action as used in other contexts. See Jeffrey O.
Cooper, Interpreting the Americans with Disabilities Act: The Trials of Textualism and
the Practical Limits of Practical Reason, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1207, 1231-48 (2000)
(explaining the difficulties making this distinction).
90
“In comparison to the battle fought over the Rehabilitaion Act of 1973 and the
section 504 regulations, the process that led to title II of the ADA and its regulations
was easy.” Weber, supra note 72, at 1095. Section 504 already covered most
governmental units, and Title II was perceived as merely extending that coverage a
small degree. Id.
91
42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2000).
92
Pathways Psychosocial v. Town of Leonardtown, 133 F. Supp. 2d 772, 780 (D.
Md. 2001) (internal citations omitted).
93
42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2000). The ADA statute defines a “public entity” as “(A) any
State or local government; (B) any department, agency, special purpose district, or other
instrumentality of a State or States or local government.” Id. § 12131(1). The statute,
88
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The chief difference between the statutes is that Section 504
applies to all entities that receive federal financial assistance95 whereas
Title II covers “any State or local government” or “any department,
agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or
States or local government.”96
Title II’s language, combined with the legislative history of the
ADA, suggests that Congress intended this prohibition against
discrimination to cover a broad range of state and local governmental
actions.97 For example, in the legislative history of Title II, the
congressional committees held out Choate as the definitive
interpretation of Section 504 and Title II. 98 Davis, in contrast, was
never mentioned. Similarly, a few other cases, all sympathetic to the
claims of persons with disabilities, appear as examples of what
Congress wanted Title II to accomplish.99
Title II, however, has clear limits on its application. For example,
Congress and the regulators adopted the idea that the law would not
require fundamental alterations in programs before a duty to
accommodate persons with disabilities arose.100
Rather than provide greater specificity on employment, program
accessibility, or other matters, Title II requires that the Attorney
General promulgate regulations consistent with Section 504’s
regulations.101 For employment, regulations regarding the accessibility
of new facilities must be consistent with those developed by the

however, fails to define the phrase “services, programs or activities.” Weber, supra note
72, at 1100. The term “benefit” includes the “provision of services, financial aid or
disposition (i.e., treatment, handling, decision, sentencing, confinement, or other
prescription of conduct).” 28 C.F.R. § 42.540(j) (2006).
94
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12133 (2000) (describing the prohibition against
discrimination in the provision of public services). See also William H. Grogan, The
Tension Between Local Zoning and the Development of Elderly Housing: Analyzing the
Use of the Fair Housing Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act to Override
Zoning Decisions, 33 SUFFOLK U. L. Rev. 317, 334-37 (2000).
95
29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000).
96
42 U.S.C. § 12131(1) (2000).
97
See H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 84 (1990), as reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 367 (stating that Title II extends to all state and local governmental
actions).
98
“[I]t is . . . the Committee’s intent that section 202 also be interpreted consistent
with Alexander v. Choate.” Id.
99
See, e.g., id. at 50, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 473 (citing with approval the
concurrence in ADAPT v. Skinner, 881 F.2d 1184, 1203 (3d Cir. 1989), a case that
approved a separate but equal transportation service for persons with disabilities).
100
28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a)(3) (2006).
101
See Weber, supra note 72, at 1117 (“It can be said that Title II’s legislative
history is, in reality, a form of subsequent legislative history for Section 504.”).
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Department of Justice (“DOJ”) in its role coordinating the
implementation of Section 504 for other federal agencies.102
The DOJ regulations implementing Title II are, therefore, entitled
to controlling weight.103 In promulgating these regulations, the DOJ
interpreted Title II to prohibit a broad range of discrimination by public
entities.104 The regulations expressly apply to “all services, programs,
and activities provided or made available by public entities.”105 The
regulations also state that the statute applies to all state and local
governmental services, programs and activities and contain a reasonable
accommodation provision.106
The implementing regulations are also directly applicable to
Wisconsin Community Service, Inc. v. City of Milwaukee. In discussing
when a municipality may be required to make a reasonable
accommodation under the ADA, the DOJ’s ADA Technical Assistance
Manual specifically utilizes a municipal zoning ordinance as an
illustration of when such a requirement may arise, indicating that the
DOJ interprets the ADA as extending to zoning ordinances and
decisions.107
IV. COMMON LAW ANALYSIS
In addition to the legislative history, an analysis of precedent
reveals that courts have repeatedly found that reasonable
102

42 U.S.C. § 12134(b) (2000).
See, e.g., Innovative Health Sys., Inc. v. City of White Plains, 117 F.3d 37, 45
(2d Cir. 1997); Does 1-5 v. Chandler, 83 F.3d 1150, 1153 (9th Cir. 1996); Helen L. v.
DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 331 (3d Cir. 1995) (“Because Title II was enacted with broad
language and directed the Department of Justice to promulgate regulations . . . the
regulations which the Department of Justice promulgated are entitled to substantial
deference.”).
104
See 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b) (2006) (listing several categories of activities that
constitute discrimination by public entities).
105
28 C.F.R. § 35.102(a) (2006).
106
See 28 C.F.R. § 35.102(a) (stating Title II applies to “all services, programs, or
activities” by public entities). Title II prohibits discrimination in “all services,
programs, and activities provided or made available by State and local governments or
any of their instrumentalities or agencies.” 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A (1999); 28 C.F.R.
§35.130(b)(7) (explaining that Title II, like Title I and Title III, also contains a
reasonable accommodation provision).
107
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT TITLE II TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL, II-3.6100 (1993) (utilizing
zoning ordinance as example of when municipality required to make reasonable
modification); see also Oconomowoc Residential Programs, Inc. v. City of Milwaukee,
300 F.3d 775, 782 (7th Cir. 2002) (applying the FHAA to zoning and noting that the
“requirements for reasonable accommodation under the ADA are the same as those
under the FHAA”); Reg’l Econ. Cmty. Action Program, Inc., v. City of Middletown,
294 F.3d 35, 45-46 (2d Cir. 2002).
103
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accommodation is a cause of action under both the Rehabilitation Act
and the ADA.
A. Supreme Court Decisions Imply that There Is a Duty of Reasonable
Accommodation in Title II of the ADA
The Supreme Court has implied that Title II of the ADA contains
an affirmative duty of reasonable accommodation. In Tennessee v.
Lane,108 for example, the Court discussed the broad scope of Title II.
The Court recognized that because “failure to accommodate persons
with disabilities will often have the same practical effect as outright
exclusion, Congress required the States to take reasonable measures to
remove architectural and other barriers to [program] accessibility.”109
Going further, the Court stated that Title II’s “duty to accommodate”
requires “‘reasonable modifications’ that would not fundamentally alter
the nature of the service provided, and only when the individual seeking
modification is otherwise eligible for the service.”110
Joined by Justices Souter and Breyer, Justice Ginsburg noted in a
concurring opinion that: “Including individuals with disabilities among
people who count in composing ‘We the People,’ Congress understood
in shaping the ADA, would sometimes require not blindfolded equality,
but responsiveness to difference; not indifference, but
accommodation.”111 Justice Ginsburg stated that in Olmstead v.
Zimring, the Court “responded with fidelity to the ADA’s
accommodation theme.”112 Justice Ginsburg explained that: “Congress,
the Court [has] observed, advanced in the ADA ‘a more comprehensive
view of the concept of discrimination,’ one that embraced failures to
provide ‘reasonable accommodations.’ The Court [in Lane] is similarly
faithful to the Act’s demand for reasonable accommodation to secure
access and avoid exclusion.”113
In Olmstead, the Court analyzed Title II’s reasonable
accommodation requirement in the context of the deinstitutionalization
of mentally ill individuals. The Court held that Title II of the ADA is
meant to be consistent with § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, which
provides for reasonable accommodation unless “the accommodation
would impose an undue hardship on the operation of its program.”114
108

541 U.S. 509 (2004).
Id. at 531.
Id. at 532.
111
Id. at 536 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
112
Id. at 537.
113
Id. (quoting Olmstead v. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 598 (1999), which rejected the
Eleventh Circuit’s strict construction of the reasonable modification requirement).
114
527 U.S. at 606 n.16 (citation omitted).
109
110
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Although the Court required a balancing of the reasonableness of the
requested accommodation with the City’s available resources, it
recognized that an affirmative duty of accommodation existed in Title
II.115
In U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett,116 the Supreme Court ruled that
the reasonable accommodation requirement of the ADA imposes an
affirmative duty on public entities to waive a rule that would not be
waived for a non-disabled individual. Although Barnett involved a
claim of employment discrimination under Title I of the ADA, the
Court found the language in Title I to be nearly identical to the
language in Title II. The Court explained that:
The Act requires preferences in the form of ‘reasonable
accommodations’ that are needed for those with disabilities to
obtain the same . . . opportunities that those without disabilities
automatically enjoy. By definition any special ‘accommodation’
requires the [entity] to treat [individuals] with a disability
differently, i.e., preferentially. And the fact that the difference
in treatment violates an [entity’s] disability-neutral rule cannot
by itself place the accommodation beyond the Act’s potential
reach.117

The Supreme Court, therefore, implicitly acknowledged that Title II of
the ADA contains a duty to reasonably accommodate the needs of the
disabled.
B. Other Courts Have Also Recognized that Title II of the ADA Includes
the Failure to Reasonably Accommodate as a Theory of Recovery
In McPherson v. Michigan High School Athletic Ass’n,118 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit outlined its
analysis for Title II claims. In comparing Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act and Title II of the ADA, the court noted that “[i]t is
well-established that the two statutes are quite similar in purpose and
scope” and since “the standards under both of the acts are largely the
same, cases construing one statute are instructive in construing the
other.”119

115
See Ellen M. Weber, Bridging the Barriers: Public Health Strategies for
Expanding Drug Treatment in Communities, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 631, 684 n. 224
(2005) (citing Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 605-07).
116
535 U.S. 391 (2002).
117
Id. at 397-98.
118
119 F.3d 453 (6th Cir. 1997).
119
Id. at 459-60. (citations omitted).
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With respect to whether the requirements of Title I and Title III
apply to Title II of the ADA, the court stated that “most of the law that
has been made in ADA cases has arisen in the context of employment
discrimination claims, but we have no doubt that the decisional
principles of these cases may be applied to this [Title II] case.”120 The
court held that “there are two methods that would allow the plaintiff[s]
to demonstrate that . . . actions were taken because of [their] disability:
either (1) by offering evidence that . . . disabilities were actually
considered . . . in formulating or implementing the . . . rule, or (2) by
showing that the [entity] could have reasonably accommodated [the
plaintiffs’] disability, but refused to do so.”121 Although the court found
the requested accommodation to be unreasonable in that case, it
nevertheless ruled that lack of reasonable accommodation was a
cognizable theory of recovery under Title II of the ADA.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has
employed a similar analysis for Title II claims. In Regional Economic
Community Action Program, Inc., v. City of Middletown, for example,
the court held that the FHA, the Rehabilitation Act, and the ADA all
apply to zoning decisions.122 Moreover, the court stated that
“[p]laintiffs who allege violations under the ADA, the FHA, and the
Rehabilitation Act may proceed under any or all of three theories:
disparate treatment, disparate impact, and failure to make reasonable
accommodation.”123
Furthermore, in Pathways Psychosocial v. Town of
Leonardtown124 a mental health clinic argued that the town’s denial of
an occupancy permit constituted unlawful discrimination under the
ADA. The court found that “the ADA must be broadly construed to
effectuate its purpose”125 and recognized four different theories of
recovery “under the ADA: 1) intentional discrimination; 2) disparate
impact resulting from a facially neutral policy; 3) failure to provide a
120

Id. at 460.
Id.; see also Ability Ctr. of Greater Toledo v. City of Sandusky, 385 F.3d 901,
910 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that “Title II demands that, in certain instances, public
entities take affirmative actions to provide qualified disabled individuals with access to
public services.”).
122
294 F.3d 35, 45-46 (2d Cir. 2002); see, e.g., Nevels v. W. World Ins. Co., 359 F.
Supp. 2d 1110, 1120-21 (W.D. Wash. 2004); Dr. Gertrude A. Barber Ctr., Inc., v. Peters
Twp., 273 F. Supp. 2d 643, 652 (W.D. Pa. 2003) (applying the reasonable
accommodation provision of the FHA to zoning decisions).
123
294 F.3d at 48; see also Powell v. Nat’l Bd. of Med. Examiners, 364 F.3d 79 (2d
Cir. 2004); Tsombanidis v. West Haven Fire Dep’t, 352 F.3d 565 (2d Cir. 2003).
124
133 F. Supp. 2d 772 (D. Md. 2001).
125
Id. at 780 (citing Civic Ass’n of Deaf of New York City v. Giuliani, 915 F. Supp.
622, 633 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)).
121
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reasonable accommodation; and 4) impermissible segregation of mental
health services for people with mental illness.”126 The court ruled that
“based on the plain language of the [Department of Justice’s] regulation
as well as precedent, the proper standard for determining a reasonable
accommodation is to first inquire whether it is 1) reasonable and 2)
necessary.”127
C. Seventh Circuit Case Law
In Oconomowoc Residential Programs, Inc. v. City of
Milwaukee,128 the Seventh Circuit compared the requirements of the
FHAA to those imposed by Title II of the ADA. The court noted that
“[l]ike the FHAA, the ADA ‘provide[s] a clear and comprehensive
national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against
individuals with disabilities.’”129 The court in Oconomowoc found that
the “requirements for reasonable accommodation under the ADA are
the same as those under the FHAA.”130 The court stated that under both
the FHAA and the ADA, “a public entity must reasonably
accommodate a qualified individual with a disability by making
changes in rules, policies, practices, or services when needed.”131
Moreover, the “term ‘reasonable accommodation’ in the FHAA is often
interpreted by analogy with the same phrase in the Rehabilitation Act”
and “the definition of ‘reasonable accommodation’ in the Rehabilitation
Act is the same as that in the ADA.”132
The Seventh Circuit in Oconomowoc held that the FHAA, and by
implication the ADA, “requires accommodation if such accommodation
(1) is reasonable, and (2) necessary, (3) to afford a handicapped person
the equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.”133 The court held
that an “accommodation is reasonable if it is both efficacious and
proportional to the costs to implement it.”134 An accommodation is
necessary, according to the Seventh Circuit, if “the desired
accommodation will affirmatively enhance a disabled plaintiff’s quality

126

Id.
Id. at 789; see also Behavioral Health Servs., Inc. v. City of Gardena, 2003 WL
21750852 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2003); Buchanan v. Maine, 366 F. Supp. 2d. 169 (D. Me.
2005) (recognizing a Title II reasonable accommodation claim).
128
300 F.3d 775 (7th Cir. 2002).
129
Id. at 782 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1)).
130
Id. at 783.
131
Id. at 782-83 (emphasis added).
132
Id. at 783 (internal citations omitted).
133
Id.
134
Id. at 784.
127
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of life by ameliorating the effects of the disability.”135 Once the
plaintiffs show that the accommodation they seek is reasonable, the
“defendant must come forward to demonstrate unreasonableness or
undue hardship in the particular circumstances.”136
The Seventh Circuit noted the similarities between Title II of the
ADA and the FHAA again in Dadian v. Village of Wilmette.137
According to the court in Dadian, the “overall focus should be on
whether waiver of the rule in the particular case at hand would be so at
odds with the purposes behind the rule that it would be a fundamental
and unreasonable change.”138 The court concluded that “the methods of
proving discrimination under Titles I and III should also apply to Title
II.”139
In Washington v. Indiana High School Athletic Ass’n, the Seventh
Circuit noted that “this and other circuits interpret § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act and Title II of the ADA as coextensive.”140 The court
ruled that:
In our view, the Sixth Circuit outlined correctly . . . the various
methods of proof in § 504 Rehabilitation Act or Title II ADA
claims: discrimination under both acts may be established by
evidence that (1) the defendant intentionally acted on the basis
of the disability, (2) the defendant refused to provide a
reasonable modification, or (3) the defendant’s rule
disproportionately impacts disabled people.141

The Seventh Circuit held that “it is possible to demonstrate
discrimination on the basis of disability by a defendant’s refusal to
make a reasonable accommodation.”142
In Hemisphere Building Co., Inc., v. Village of Richton Park,143
the Seventh Circuit analyzed a claim for reasonable accommodation
under the FHAA. The court held that the “duty of reasonable
accommodation [applies] . . . to rules, policies, etc. that hurt
handicapped people by reason of their handicap, rather than that hurt
them solely by virtue of what they have in common with other people,
such as a limited amount of money to spend on housing.”144
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144

Id.
Id. at 783.
269 F.3d 831, 837 (7th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 838-39 (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 841 (internal citations omitted).
181 F.3d 840, 846 (7th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 847.
Id. at 848.
171 F.3d 437 (7th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 440.
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Lastly, in Good Shepherd Manor Foundation, Inc., v. City of
Momence, the plaintiff sought relief for alleged discrimination under
the FHAA and the ADA under the theories of “discriminatory intent
and impact and under a theory that the city failed to provide reasonable
accommodations.”145 The court held that “the requirements for showing
failure to reasonably accommodate are the same under the ADA and the
FHAA.”146 The court provided the following example of how a
reasonable accommodation claim works:
[I]f a city required all houses to have narrow doorways, and the
city failed to waive this requirement, this might harm people in
wheelchairs by reason of the fact that they are in wheelchairs . .
. . Th[e] requirement to reasonably accommodate would exist
regardless of the motivation behind the narrow-doorway rule . .
. . The error in the city’s logic is all the more clear when we
consider that reasonable accommodation is . . . an alternative
theory of liability.147

D. Critique of Judge Easterbrook’s Reasoning
We contend that Judge Easterbrook’s reading of the relevant
statutory texts is flawed. To start, where a statute such as the ADA is to
be broadly construed, “textualism does not provide the tools necessary
to arrive at the deterministic conclusion that textualists desire.”148 This
is because the statute will often contain ambiguities that force a
textualist to go outside the confines of the act. For example, Judge
Easterbrook limits the Seventh Circuit’s holding in Good Shepherd by
finding that the FHAA’s reasonable accommodation provision applies
only when a showing of disparate impact has been made. Yet the texts
of the FHAA, the Rehabilitation Act and Titles I and III of the ADA do
not articulate an antecedent need to show disparate impact. Nor do they
suggest that reasonable accommodation is merely a remedy for
disparate impact, rather than an independent theory of recovery. Only
by looking outside the text could Judge Easterbrook have found that a
claimant must prove disparate impact or intentional discrimination
before the reasonable accommodation provision applies.
Next, although Title II does not contain a reasonable
accommodation provision, it does direct the Attorney General to enact
regulations to resolve any ambiguities contained in its text. The DOJ’s
145
146
147
148

323 F.3d 557, 560 (7th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 561.
Id. at 561-62.
Cooper, supra note 89, at 1255.
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regulations unambiguously recognize a cause of action for failure to
provide reasonable accommodations wholly separate from a claim of
intentional discrimination or disparate impact.149 The text of Title II,
therefore, which calls on the DOJ to clarify its meaning, imposes a duty
of reasonable accommodation on public entities.
Going further, even if Judge Easterbrook’s contention that the
ADA requires merely equal access to public services for disabled
individuals is correct, an affirmative duty of reasonable accommodation
would be the only way to ensure equal access for WCS’s clientele.
Every individual, for instance, needs dental health services, regardless
of whether he or she is disabled. A denial of a special use permit to a
dental health facility, therefore, could not be based on any disability of
the facility’s clientele because all of the facility’s clientele, disabled and
non-disabled alike, would be denied access to the services it provides
by the decision to deny a permit.
Disabled individuals, however, need reasonable accommodations
to access certain services precisely because they are disabled. For
example, only the mentally ill need the services of a mental health
clinic. Denying a special use permit to a mental health clinic, therefore,
would only affect the mentally ill’s ability to gain access to necessary
health services. Because the services provided by WCS are intended for
the sole benefit of the mentally ill, there is no comparable group of nondisabled people with whom to place the mentally ill on equal footing.
In addition, building owners are required to build ramps to allow
wheelchair-bound people to gain access to the services provided inside
the building, such as dental health services, which presumably both
disabled and non-disabled people need. The ramp ensures equal access
to the building for both disabled and non-disabled individuals because
both groups require the services provided inside the building. But since
only the mentally ill require mental health services, comparing dental
health clinics to mental health clinics is like comparing apples to
oranges.
Title II’s duty of reasonable accommodation is meant to cover
precisely this situation. BOZA could not deny WCS a permit because
WCS’s clients are mentally ill. That would constitute intentional
discrimination. Moreover, if WCS could show that the City’s neutral
zoning rules have a disparate impact on its clients as compared to nondisabled people because of their mental illnesses,150 it could properly
149

See 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7).
Since denial of a dental health permit would still leave people with plenty of
other options to obtain dental health care in the City whereas WCS is one of the only
providers of mental health treatment to non-institutionalized individuals, the denial of
150
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state a claim of disparate impact under the ADA. Reasonable
accommodation, however, is a theory of recovery wholly separate from
disparate impact because it applies to situations where there is no group
of non-disabled people to measure the affects of a neutral rule or
procedure against. As Judge Wood noted in his dissenting opinion,
Judge Easterbrook’s approach “risks having the unfortunate effect of
barring the disabled from relief just when they need it most: when a
public entity is failing to provide a service that only the disabled would
need, under circumstances where intentional discrimination and
disparate impact would be impossible to prove as a practical matter.”151
Since a showing of “reasonableness” and “necessity” is fairly easy
to make, reasonable accommodation shifts the burden to the City to
show why accommodating the request of WCS would be an undue
hardship, i.e., financial, violates their plan for the area, et cetera. The
City maintains the authority to deny the permit, but it must show why
the accommodation request is unreasonable in order to do so, instead of
basing its decision solely on the determination that WCS failed to meet
the City’s zoning criteria for obtaining a permit.
Judge Easterbrook’s decision, therefore, is problematic because it
eliminates the one avenue of recovery that those in need of special
services have to pursue their claims. WCS, for example, could not show
intentional discrimination because the City’s zoning rules are facially
neutral. Moreover, it would be extremely difficult for WCS to make a
showing of disparate impact because only the mentally ill require
mental health treatment. Thus there is no comparable class or group of
non-disabled persons against whom to compare the affects of the City’s
neutral zoning rules. Only under a theory of failure to provide a
reasonable accommodation could WCS show that the City’s denial of a
special use permit was unreasonable under the facts of this case.
Without the right to pursue a reasonable accommodation claim, WCS’s
clientele are effectively denied access to any non-institutionalized
mental health treatment in the City of Milwaukee.
V. CONCLUSION
The plain language of the FHAA and Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act imposes an affirmative duty of reasonable
accommodation on public entities. Likewise, Title I and Title III of the
ADA recognize reasonable accommodation as a theory of recovery in
the permit leaves its clients with virtually no options for non-institutionalized mental
health care.
151
Wisconsin Cmty. Serv., Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 413 F.3d 642, 651 (Wood, J.,
dissenting).

456

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 2:433

the contexts of employment and public accommodations discrimination.
The Department of Justice’s regulations, which implement Title II,
unambiguously extend the affirmative duty of accommodation to public
entities in the context of zoning.
Moreover, the case law interpreting Title II, from the Supreme
Court, to the courts of other circuits, to the Seventh Circuit’s own
rulings in Oconomowoc, Dadian, Washington, and Good Shepherd,
supports claims for a public entity’s failure to provide reasonable
accommodations to otherwise qualified disabled individuals. Judge
Easterbrook’s decision, therefore, goes against precedent, legislative
history and the implementing regulations of Title II.
However, Judge Easterbrook’s analysis is not without basis. Judge
Easterbrook arrived at his decision through the widely accepted
textualist method of statutory interpretation. As one commentator
noted, the “textualist judge approaches this mechanistic process by
consulting the statutory text, related statutory provisions, and
standardized external sources . . . such that the judge might consistently
arrive at an interpretation that reasonably fulfills the commands of the
text.”152 As Judge Easterbrook explained, although Title I and Title III
of the ADA (which address discrimination in employment and public
accommodations) contain explicit reasonable accommodation
provisions, Title II of the ADA contains no such language. The text of
Title II, therefore, does not impose a duty of reasonable accommodation
on public entities.
Moreover, other courts have supported Judge Easterbrook’s
finding that Title II does not require public entities to meet the special
needs of disabled individuals. The Second Circuit, for example, has
held that the ADA requires merely “evenhanded treatment” in relation
to non-disabled people rather than the provision of additional benefits
to the disabled.153 Judge Easterbrook notes that Milwaukee requires all
health clinics, whether they provide services to the general public or
services geared specifically towards disabled individuals, to obtain a
special use permit in the area where WCS’s proposed facility is located.
Under this view, since the City’s zoning ordinance applies equally to
clinics serving the disabled and the non-disabled, the City is under no
duty to “bend the rules” for a mental health service provider like WCS
simply because its clientele are considered disabled under the ADA.
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Cooper, supra note 89, at 1211-12.
See Doe v. Pfrommer, 148 F.3d 73, 82 (2d Cir. 1998) (internal citations omitted);
see also Henrietta D. v. Giuliani, 81 F. Supp. 2d 425, 431 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (citing
Rodriguez v. City of New York, 197 F.3d 611 (2d Cir. 1999)).
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Moreover, a lack of financial resources affects both disabled and
non-disabled people alike. In Hemisphere Building, for example, the
Seventh Circuit held that a public entity was under no duty to grant a
special use permit to a developer in order to make the wheelchairaccessible homes he planned to build more affordable for the disabled
because a limited amount of money is something disabled people have
in common with non-disabled people.154 Therefore, the developer’s
potential customers were not entitled to a reasonable accommodation in
Hemisphere Building because non-disabled people’s housing options
are also limited by a lack of financial resources.155
Finally, Judge Easterbrook’s contention that reasonable
accommodation is merely a remedy for a claim of disparate impact
instead of an independent cause of action is not without merit. In Good
Shepherd, for example, the Seventh Circuit ruled that “reasonable
accommodation is a theory of liability separate from intentional
discrimination” so that plaintiffs could make a claim under the ADA
even where a city’s actions were not motivated by a discriminatory
animus.156 This ruling could be construed as merely recognizing a
disparate impact claim, which applies where neutral rules, unmotivated
by discriminatory intent, nevertheless harm disabled individuals more
than non-disabled individuals by reason of their disability. In Judge
Easterbrook’s view, the remedy for disabled individuals disparately
impacted by the facially neutral rules of a public entity is reasonable
accommodation. Proof of disparate impact is thus necessary before a
public entity must provide a reasonable accommodation.
There is, therefore, a real danger that the Seventh Circuit sitting en
banc will affirm Judge Easterbrook. If it does there would be a split in
the circuit courts and the case will eventually make its way to the
Supreme Court. Given the current structure of the court, the Court may
side with Judge Easterbrook.
In anticipation of this outcome, it is essential that attorneys
arguing for reasonable accommodation lay out proper and strong legal
reasoning. We hope that this article helps in this endeavor.
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171 F.3d 437, 440 (7th Cir. 1999).
Id.
323 F.3d 557, 562 (7th Cir. 2003).

